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            NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






HENG CAI CHEN, 




 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE 
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
        Respondent  
_______________________ 
 
On Petition for Review from the Board of Immigration Appeals 
BIA-1 No. A094-799-621 
Immigration Judge: The Honorable Eugene Pugliese 
_______________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 16, 2015 
 
Before: SMITH, JORDAN, and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 







Smith, Circuit Judge. 
                                              
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 On September 1, 2006, the Department of Homeland Security served Heng Cai 
Chen, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, with a Notice to Appear.  
The notice charged Chen with being removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) as 
an inadmissible immigrant who entered the United States without the required entry 
documents.  Chen’s subsequent application for asylum, withholding of removal, and 
relief under the Convention Against Torture was denied.  His appeal to the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA) was unsuccessful, as were two motions to reopen.  Chen 
filed a third motion to reopen after learning that he was the beneficiary of an approved I-
130 petition filed by his United States citizen wife.  Although Chen recognized that he 
was ineligible for a waiver of his unauthorized presence in the United States under 8 
C.F.R. § 212.7(e)(4)(v) and (vi), he urged the BIA to reopen his proceeding, vacate his 
final order of removal, and then administratively close his proceeding so he could file an 
I-601A application for waiver of his inadmissibility.  AR 15. 
 In an order dated August 6, 2014, the BIA denied Chen’s third motion to reopen.  
It pointed out, and Chen does not dispute, that the motion was both number-barred and 
untimely, and that the motion failed to establish that it satisfied any exception to these 
filing requirements.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (c)(7)(C)(i) & (ii).  The order further 
stated that Chen failed to demonstrate exceptional circumstances, which would warrant 
granting the motion sua sponte.  As authority, the BIA provided a pincite to its own 
precedent in In re J-J, 21 I.&N. Dec. 976, 984 (BIA 1997), which acknowledged that its 
power to sua sponte reopen was limited to exceptional situations and “is not meant to be 
used . . . to otherwise circumvent the regulations, where enforcing them might result in 
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hardship.”  In a footnote, the BIA instructed that any request “for an unauthorized 
presence waiver would have to be pursued before the Department of Homeland 
Security.”  Thereafter, Chen filed a timely petition for review.1 
 “Because the BIA retains unfettered discretion to decline to sua sponte reopen or 
reconsider a deportation proceeding, this court is without jurisdiction to review a decision 
declining to exercise such discretion to reopen or reconsider the case.”  Calle-Vujiles v. 
Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 472, 475 (3d Cir. 2003).  In Pllumi v. Attorney General, 642 F.3d 155 
(3d Cir. 2011), we recognized an exception to the rule set out in Calle-Vujiles if the 
“decision not to reopen sua sponte reflects an error of law.”  Id. at 160.   
 Chen acknowledges that our jurisdiction to review a decision to deny sua sponte 
reopening is limited and recites the above legal principles twice in his opening brief.  
Appellant’s Opening Br. at 5, 6.  Yet Chen fails to identify the error of law that would 
permit our exercise of jurisdiction.  Id.  Our review of the record before us fails to reveal 
that the BIA’s decision was based on a misperception of the applicable law.  
Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s sua sponte denial of Chen’s third 
motion to reopen.  We will dismiss Chen’s petition for review. 
                                              
1 The BIA exercised jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2.  We have jurisdiction under 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(a). 
